Crimes of Command
Crimes of Command - Blog
Crimes of Command examines how the Navy lost its way in understanding of the bedrock principles of accountability, responsibility, authority, and culpability - eventually conflating them all with blame. Analyzing over 1500 individual instances of ship collisions, groundings, explosions, fires, and personal leadership failings, Dr. Junge shows how the Navy has changed and how actions once excused are now irrevocable career killers. Using ethical and psychological theory, Michael shows the Navy a path back towards including forgiveness as a core leadership tenet. This blog provides insight into the book as well as current Navy and national issues related to crimes of command.
Is this new?7/25/2018 A major question I sought to answer was this: Has the Navy always removed as many commanding officers as it does today? Even a cursory review of history shows that many naval heroes lost their ships to war or nature but retained their roles as commanders.
In 1803, Commodore William Bainbridge grounded USS Philadelphia off Tripoli, was captured and imprisoned. Today, USS Bainbridge (DDG 96), an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, is the fifth U.S. Navy ship named for him. In 1778, Commodore John Barry ran USS Raleigh aground during combat action and then abandoned the ship. The British captured and refloated her. John Barry, because he possessed the first United States government commission as a naval officer, is considered the “Father of the Navy” and USS Barry (DDG 52), also an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, is the fourth U.S. Navy ship in his honor. In 1908, Ensign Chester W. Nimitz was court-martialed and removed from command after running USS Decatur (DD 5) aground in the Philippines. In 1944, this same Nimitz became the Navy’s third Fleet Admiral, supervised the Pacific Theater of World War II, became Chief of Naval Officers and the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) is named in his honor. In some cases, documented by Gregory L. Vistica in 1995’s Fall from Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy, officers were removed from command, but quietly, without public notification and without censure. Obviously not every commanding officer is either removed from command, or the U.S. Navy, for crimes of command. In time my research found over 1,500 discrete incidents for quantitative analysis. The data shows that the Navy acts differently than before. The change is identifiable, but not discreet. Like the proverbial frog in a pot of boiling water, the change was slow and gradual – and largely unnoticed. In fact, so unnoticed that even presented with quantitative data disputing the modern concept of “command accountability” officers, current and retired, will dispute it and insist that the tradition is as it always has been. Comments are closed.
AuthorMichael Junge is an active duty Navy Captain with degrees from the United States Naval Academy, United States Naval War College, the George Washington University, and Salve Regina University. He served afloat in five different ships and was the 14th Commanding Officer of USS WHIDBEY ISLAND (LSD 41). He has written extensively with articles appearing in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings magazine, US Naval War College’s Luce.nt, and on the blog “Information Dissemination”. ArchivesCategories |
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