Crimes of Command
1965 - 1985
The middle of the twentieth century saw significant and far-reaching advancements in naval technology with the arrival of cruise missiles and nuclear-powered ships. USS Nautilus (SSN 571) in 1955, the nuclear-powered supercarrier, USS Enterprise (CVN 65) and USS Long Beach (CGN 9) in 1961 replaced oil-fired steam boilers with nuclear-heated steam creating virtually unlimited power levels. New technology in ship propulsion, missile guidance, and navigation complemented the major ‘hot’ conflicts of the Cold War, Vietnam and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Baby Boom generation began service while the vast majority of World War II veterans retired.
The fleet continued shrinking in numbers while ship sizes grew. Destroyers were now over 400 feet long, displaced over 4000 tons, and had a crew of 350 officers and men; but oil-fired boilers still generated steam to turn turbines and rotate propeller shafts. Long Beach was 15,000-tons and over 700 feet long – larger and heavier than World War II armored heavy cruisers and the Navy’s largest post-war surface combatant. Except for the new nuclear boats, submarines remained diesel powered and largely unchanged from their World War II counterparts at 300-feet long, displacing 1,500 tons and had a crew of 60 to 80 officers and men. The first two nuclear submarines, Seawolf and Nautilus, were respectively 350 and 320 feet long and both displaced over 3000 tons with crews of just over 100 officers and men. The first production class of nuclear submarine, Skate, displaced 2250 tons, was 267 feet long and manned by 84 officers and men. Ship navigation continued on inadequate and incomplete charts; however electronic navigation systems, (1944) and inertial navigation systems (1950), slowly replaced celestial navigation. By 1965 most ships had some means of electronic navigation for coastal, or even open ocean, positioning. Surface launched anti-air missiles debuted. Technological complexity in new ships rose while most of the force aged. The surface navy instituted a formal department head school in 1962 and a command school in 1969. Both moves attempted to solve training, manning and experience problems in surface ships. Prior to 1962 department heads, the shipboard equivalent to middle managers, were sometimes newly commissioned officers with no experience, or very limited experience. Creating the new department head course moved those middle management tours towards officers with at least five years of commissioned service – significantly increasing the experience and maturity of the officers in these positions. This increase in experience and maturity made it to the fleet, unevenly and slowly, especially for smaller ships.
In between technological and training changes were collisions, groundings, and fires – at least 569 crimes of command removing 22 commanding officers, almost twice the number removed between 1945 and 1965. There were almost twice as many groundings (74 compared to 40), twice as many collisions (220 compared to 131) and twice as many explosions and fires (156 compared to 74). At the same time, ship numbers dropped, and by 1981, the Navy had 521 ships, the post-war low to that date. More importantly, the ideas of blame and culpability moved from one of individual responsibility of the commanding officer towards one of command culpability – the commander now responsible, even accountable and culpable, for the actions of the entire command.
USS Frank E. Evans and HMAS Melbourne - 1969
On June 3, 1969, United States, Australian, New Zealand, and British naval vessels took part in a South East Asia Treaty Organization exercise called “Sea Spirit.”[1] Two of the ships, the Allen M Sumner-class destroyer USS Frank E. Evans (DD-754) and HMAS Melbourne, collided. Melbourne, a British built light aircraft carrier 702 feet long and 20,000 tons cut the 2,200 ton and 376 foot long Frank E. Evans in two, killing 74 of her sailors.
Read more about Evans and Melbourne:
USS Belknap and USS John F. Kennedy - 1975
Just over six years after HMAS Melbourne cut USS Frank E. Evans in half another carrier collided with her escort, and unsurprisingly the incident between USS John F. Kennedy and USS Belknap shared many similarities with previous collisions. There were also some major differences, the most significant of which included the presence of nuclear weapons onboard both ships.
In the 19 years between 1965 and 1985, the Navy saw over 500 crimes of command removing 22 commanding officers, almost twice the number removed between 1945 and 1965. Not unsurprising, as there were twice as many incidents with far fewer ships and personnel. By the mid-1980s the rhetoric and buildup of President Reagan’s 600 ship Navy captured American imaginations and new classes of ships entered the fleet. But new ships did not mean new attitudes. By 1985 the now modern concepts of accountability, responsibility and culpability were firmly entrenched in naval lore and of the 569 crimes of command, only 150 officers (1 in 4) recovered compared to 1 in 3 between 1945 and 1965. Some of the decreased recovery came from more incidents among fewer ships, some from the changing approach to command and command responsibility. By the early 1980s ‘Hobson’s Choice’ was prevalent in officer training and fleet officers were thoroughly familiar with I Relieve You, Sir. The Navy accepted the idea that the commanding officer was wholly responsible for everything aboard ship. However, the next three decades saw even this concept reach towards excess.
The fleet continued shrinking in numbers while ship sizes grew. Destroyers were now over 400 feet long, displaced over 4000 tons, and had a crew of 350 officers and men; but oil-fired boilers still generated steam to turn turbines and rotate propeller shafts. Long Beach was 15,000-tons and over 700 feet long – larger and heavier than World War II armored heavy cruisers and the Navy’s largest post-war surface combatant. Except for the new nuclear boats, submarines remained diesel powered and largely unchanged from their World War II counterparts at 300-feet long, displacing 1,500 tons and had a crew of 60 to 80 officers and men. The first two nuclear submarines, Seawolf and Nautilus, were respectively 350 and 320 feet long and both displaced over 3000 tons with crews of just over 100 officers and men. The first production class of nuclear submarine, Skate, displaced 2250 tons, was 267 feet long and manned by 84 officers and men. Ship navigation continued on inadequate and incomplete charts; however electronic navigation systems, (1944) and inertial navigation systems (1950), slowly replaced celestial navigation. By 1965 most ships had some means of electronic navigation for coastal, or even open ocean, positioning. Surface launched anti-air missiles debuted. Technological complexity in new ships rose while most of the force aged. The surface navy instituted a formal department head school in 1962 and a command school in 1969. Both moves attempted to solve training, manning and experience problems in surface ships. Prior to 1962 department heads, the shipboard equivalent to middle managers, were sometimes newly commissioned officers with no experience, or very limited experience. Creating the new department head course moved those middle management tours towards officers with at least five years of commissioned service – significantly increasing the experience and maturity of the officers in these positions. This increase in experience and maturity made it to the fleet, unevenly and slowly, especially for smaller ships.
In between technological and training changes were collisions, groundings, and fires – at least 569 crimes of command removing 22 commanding officers, almost twice the number removed between 1945 and 1965. There were almost twice as many groundings (74 compared to 40), twice as many collisions (220 compared to 131) and twice as many explosions and fires (156 compared to 74). At the same time, ship numbers dropped, and by 1981, the Navy had 521 ships, the post-war low to that date. More importantly, the ideas of blame and culpability moved from one of individual responsibility of the commanding officer towards one of command culpability – the commander now responsible, even accountable and culpable, for the actions of the entire command.
USS Frank E. Evans and HMAS Melbourne - 1969
On June 3, 1969, United States, Australian, New Zealand, and British naval vessels took part in a South East Asia Treaty Organization exercise called “Sea Spirit.”[1] Two of the ships, the Allen M Sumner-class destroyer USS Frank E. Evans (DD-754) and HMAS Melbourne, collided. Melbourne, a British built light aircraft carrier 702 feet long and 20,000 tons cut the 2,200 ton and 376 foot long Frank E. Evans in two, killing 74 of her sailors.
Read more about Evans and Melbourne:
USS Belknap and USS John F. Kennedy - 1975
Just over six years after HMAS Melbourne cut USS Frank E. Evans in half another carrier collided with her escort, and unsurprisingly the incident between USS John F. Kennedy and USS Belknap shared many similarities with previous collisions. There were also some major differences, the most significant of which included the presence of nuclear weapons onboard both ships.
In the 19 years between 1965 and 1985, the Navy saw over 500 crimes of command removing 22 commanding officers, almost twice the number removed between 1945 and 1965. Not unsurprising, as there were twice as many incidents with far fewer ships and personnel. By the mid-1980s the rhetoric and buildup of President Reagan’s 600 ship Navy captured American imaginations and new classes of ships entered the fleet. But new ships did not mean new attitudes. By 1985 the now modern concepts of accountability, responsibility and culpability were firmly entrenched in naval lore and of the 569 crimes of command, only 150 officers (1 in 4) recovered compared to 1 in 3 between 1945 and 1965. Some of the decreased recovery came from more incidents among fewer ships, some from the changing approach to command and command responsibility. By the early 1980s ‘Hobson’s Choice’ was prevalent in officer training and fleet officers were thoroughly familiar with I Relieve You, Sir. The Navy accepted the idea that the commanding officer was wholly responsible for everything aboard ship. However, the next three decades saw even this concept reach towards excess.
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