Crimes of Command
The Reasons
As culpability for crimes of command moved from that of individual responsibility to one that is command wide, the modern application of command removal also changed. To some degree this began with Connelly Stevenson‘s removal from command for letting go-go dancer Cat Futch dance on USS Finback’s sail, continued through Ranger and Arthur Fredrickson, and cemented itself in Tailhook’s aftermath. In public consciousness command removal is now about personal misconduct, largely because personal misconduct is salacious and interesting. Where a landlocked citizen might forgive a ship collision, grounding, or major fire as part of doing business at sea, adultery, drunkeness or simple stupidity are all too universal, inexcusable, and palatable for removing someone from command. When more officers are removed from command for personal misconduct, then the operational crimes of command are subsumed into the larger group.
Over the past decade the Navy, individual naval officers, journalists, pundits and citizens offered their ideas of why the Navy removes commanders from command. All come to different answers in different ways. Women in the Navy is one answer. Changed societal norms another. The “tradition older than the country itself” is the most common, along with the idea that removing a commander is normal, common, and proper. At some level, removal from command is all that - normal, common, and proper. However, removal was far less normal or common in the 1950s through the 1970s so why is removal now common?
Ask anyone who follows or served in the Navy, or the military, or even government and you will get at least one answer. Every few years another article, editorial, or even news story scratches at the problem. Is it alcohol? Women? Smaller Navy? Bigger responsibilities? Social media? Technology? Everyone has an answer and some even support the answer with anecdotes. With only four limited studies in recent history no one has a good grasp of the issues, or the changes, since the end of the Cold War, much less since the end of World War II.
Overall reasons or issues
Breaking the removal timeframe into three periods - 1945 to 1965, 1965 to 1985 and 1985 to 2015 provides part of the answer. In general, the Navy only addresses removals when they are publicized. In 2011, after the second 21st century spike, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead, referred to this spike as “bothersome” but also noted that the Navy must uphold strict behavioral standards, even for off-duty personnel. He made a clear declaration that a commander’s entire life was under scrutiny - “The divide between our private and professional lives is essentially gone. People can engage in the debate — does it really matter what a commanding officer does in their personal life? We believe it does, because it gets right to the issue of integrity and personal conduct and trust and the ability to enforce standards.”
Roughead highlighted one of the major contemporary changes - personal conduct. Between 1985 and 2015, there were 683 incidents resulting in 305 removals from command. Of those 305 removals, over one third (138) were for personal conduct not necessarily related to command, or even a classic crime of command. By comparison there is only one documented removal for personal behavior between 1965 and 1985. Modern ship operations are safer. Aircraft are safer. Social mores have changed. Unfortunately, the modern focus on personal behavior hides the historical approaches to crimes of command, as well as the historical resolution, or lack thereof, for personal misconduct.
The current response from Navy leadership is that firings are problematic, troublesome, or “bothersome.” Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy from 2009 to 2017, said in 2011 that he didn't see a broader problem with the also routine response that only a tiny percentage of commanding officers are removed. Summing up the culture and how he saw the system holding commanders to account he said, “We hold absolute standards of conduct and if you breach those, you're going to be relieved, but I don't see a pattern.”
When studies look at very small populations, short time periods, or conflate anecdotes with data, the results, while possibly satisfying in the short term, are imprecise, inaccurate...or just wrong. Such was the case in 2011 with the second removal spike and interested parties grasped for answers. Personal misconduct was a clear statistical change, and alcohol abuse and sexual escapades grabbed headlines with vague terms and statements. In one article alone, two different time scales - six months and eighteen months - were used and the catchall phrase “offenses related to sex, alcohol or other form of personal misconduct” cast the removed officers as deviants and miscreants.
The reality is that over the eighteen months in question there were forty-four incidents ranging from major fires and pirate attacks to fraternization and drunkenness. Of those forty-four, thirty-five officers were removed from command. In addition to the pirate attack, there were four collisions, two crew deaths, one major engineering casualty, and two major fires. Two collisions resulted in removal. The remaining issues were either leadership (15) or personal behavior related (20), however only two involved alcohol use by the removed commander. Ten removals resulted from some form of an inability to provide effective leadership, or a failure to act appropriately on wrongdoing. In those instances, alcohol use by others was a factor in at least three removals. On the surface, one reason for more removals or even removals in general is an increased focus on personal misconduct. However, the issue is deeper as the misconduct standard today is not what it once was, and the rationale for removal is applied not only to misconduct but also to operational incidents. Likewise, an officer removed for a crime of command - a collision or grounding - is as likely to end his career as an officer removed for theft, drunkenness, or sexual misconduct.
Over the past decade the Navy, individual naval officers, journalists, pundits and citizens offered their ideas of why the Navy removes commanders from command. All come to different answers in different ways. Women in the Navy is one answer. Changed societal norms another. The “tradition older than the country itself” is the most common, along with the idea that removing a commander is normal, common, and proper. At some level, removal from command is all that - normal, common, and proper. However, removal was far less normal or common in the 1950s through the 1970s so why is removal now common?
Ask anyone who follows or served in the Navy, or the military, or even government and you will get at least one answer. Every few years another article, editorial, or even news story scratches at the problem. Is it alcohol? Women? Smaller Navy? Bigger responsibilities? Social media? Technology? Everyone has an answer and some even support the answer with anecdotes. With only four limited studies in recent history no one has a good grasp of the issues, or the changes, since the end of the Cold War, much less since the end of World War II.
Overall reasons or issues
Breaking the removal timeframe into three periods - 1945 to 1965, 1965 to 1985 and 1985 to 2015 provides part of the answer. In general, the Navy only addresses removals when they are publicized. In 2011, after the second 21st century spike, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead, referred to this spike as “bothersome” but also noted that the Navy must uphold strict behavioral standards, even for off-duty personnel. He made a clear declaration that a commander’s entire life was under scrutiny - “The divide between our private and professional lives is essentially gone. People can engage in the debate — does it really matter what a commanding officer does in their personal life? We believe it does, because it gets right to the issue of integrity and personal conduct and trust and the ability to enforce standards.”
Roughead highlighted one of the major contemporary changes - personal conduct. Between 1985 and 2015, there were 683 incidents resulting in 305 removals from command. Of those 305 removals, over one third (138) were for personal conduct not necessarily related to command, or even a classic crime of command. By comparison there is only one documented removal for personal behavior between 1965 and 1985. Modern ship operations are safer. Aircraft are safer. Social mores have changed. Unfortunately, the modern focus on personal behavior hides the historical approaches to crimes of command, as well as the historical resolution, or lack thereof, for personal misconduct.
The current response from Navy leadership is that firings are problematic, troublesome, or “bothersome.” Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy from 2009 to 2017, said in 2011 that he didn't see a broader problem with the also routine response that only a tiny percentage of commanding officers are removed. Summing up the culture and how he saw the system holding commanders to account he said, “We hold absolute standards of conduct and if you breach those, you're going to be relieved, but I don't see a pattern.”
When studies look at very small populations, short time periods, or conflate anecdotes with data, the results, while possibly satisfying in the short term, are imprecise, inaccurate...or just wrong. Such was the case in 2011 with the second removal spike and interested parties grasped for answers. Personal misconduct was a clear statistical change, and alcohol abuse and sexual escapades grabbed headlines with vague terms and statements. In one article alone, two different time scales - six months and eighteen months - were used and the catchall phrase “offenses related to sex, alcohol or other form of personal misconduct” cast the removed officers as deviants and miscreants.
The reality is that over the eighteen months in question there were forty-four incidents ranging from major fires and pirate attacks to fraternization and drunkenness. Of those forty-four, thirty-five officers were removed from command. In addition to the pirate attack, there were four collisions, two crew deaths, one major engineering casualty, and two major fires. Two collisions resulted in removal. The remaining issues were either leadership (15) or personal behavior related (20), however only two involved alcohol use by the removed commander. Ten removals resulted from some form of an inability to provide effective leadership, or a failure to act appropriately on wrongdoing. In those instances, alcohol use by others was a factor in at least three removals. On the surface, one reason for more removals or even removals in general is an increased focus on personal misconduct. However, the issue is deeper as the misconduct standard today is not what it once was, and the rationale for removal is applied not only to misconduct but also to operational incidents. Likewise, an officer removed for a crime of command - a collision or grounding - is as likely to end his career as an officer removed for theft, drunkenness, or sexual misconduct.
Site powered by Weebly. Managed by Bluehost